

**NSS Study Group's
Policy Recommendations
for a New 2022 NSS**

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Koichi ISOBE, Lieutenant General(Ret.)

NSS Study Group

Chairman:

Ryoichi ORIKI, General, JGSDF(Ret.), former Chief of Staff, Joint Staff

Vice Chairman:

Tetsuro KUROE, former Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense

Members:

Koichi ISOBE, LTG, JGSDF(Ret.), former CG, Eastern Army

Kazuaki SUMIDA, LTG, JGSDF(Ret.), former CG, Ground Component Command

Tokuhiro IKEDA, VADM, JMSDF(Ret.), former Commandant, Kure District

Tatsuhiko TAKASHIMA, VADM, JMSDF(Ret.), former Commander, Fleet Submarine Force

Junichi ARAKI, LTG, JASDF(Ret.), former CG, Air Training Command

Shigeki MUTO, LTG, JASDF(Ret.), former CG, Air Defense Command

NSS Study Group

Objective:

Review the 2013 NSS and Make Recommendations for a new 2022 NSS from practical and realistic perspectives

Convened in Feb. 2021, Held 20 meetings and Discussed for 40+ hours, Completed in late November, and Disseminated to the Government and media.

Outlook 2022

New strategy must underline Beijing threat

Japan will continue to face challenges this year, from issues such as the pandemic to foreign affairs and the economy. This is the seventh installment of series in which authoritative figures in various fields share their thoughts on such topics. The following text was excerpted from remarks by former SDF Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Ryoichi Oriki in a recent interview with The Yomiuri Shimbun.

The Yomiuri Shimbun

The strategic rivalry between the United States and China will become more intense this year. In the United States, mid-term elections are slated to be held, and Japan and China will mark the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries. It will be important for Japan to squarely face the harsh reality of the national security environment and clarify its position.

I established an eight-member study group comprising former senior officials of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces — including former Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Tetsuro Kuroe — and we have

put together policy proposals for the National Security Strategy, which is slated to be revised at the end of this year.

Since the beginning of the 2000s, China has intensified its strategy dubbed the “Three Warfares” — public opinion, psychological and legal — in addition to increasing its military power, and it has repeatedly entered Japan’s territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands [in Ishigaki, Okinawa Prefecture.]

We must swiftly respond to attempts to change the status quo.

As far as China is concerned, a new security strategy must go beyond merely mentioning “strong national security concerns,” as stated in such documents as previous defense white papers, and at least recognize that Beijing is a “potential threat.”

Self-defense

The Japan-U.S. alliance has become ever more important. What counts most is Japan’s ability to act independently. We need to think and prepare ourselves from the perspective of protecting our country ourselves.

As the United States is paying attention not only to China but also to such regions as the Middle East, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces should assume a



The Yomiuri Shimbun

Ryoichi Oriki, 71

Former SDF Chief of Staff, Joint Staff

Hailing from Kumamoto Prefecture, he joined the Ground Self-Defense Force after graduating from the National Defense Academy in 1972. He was the highest-ranking officer in the SDF from March 2009 to January 2012, when he served as chief of staff, joint staff. He supervised the disaster response in quake-affected areas following the Great East Japan Earthquake and was a member of the expert panel established when the National Security Strategy was formulated in 2013.

more active role in the East China Sea and waters near the Japan Sea.

Having the ability to counterattack, including the ability to attack enemy bases, will reinforce deterrence. Japan will not have the capability unless it builds a comprehensive system that includes not only missiles but also improved intelligence-gathering using satellites. Japan must hold talks regarding such issues with the United States, including a review of the role

sharing between the two countries.

Every year, China builds up its intermediate-range nuclear arsenal, whose range includes Japan, but the United States, which provides Japan with its nuclear umbrella, does not have any countermeasures to dealing with such capabilities.

A frank discussion is needed on how to effectively deal with the threat of China’s nuclear arsenal and on the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not

possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons.

In addition to China, South Korea and countries in Southeast Asia have been increasing their military capabilities. If Japan continues to take a cautious stance regarding defense spending, it might become a factor in the destabilization of the region. To inject more resources into new areas such as space, and into the defense of the Nansei Islands, Japan should aim at allocating a defense budget equivalent to around 2% of its gross domestic product.

Homemade tech

The government has been discussing the establishment of legislation to promote economic security, but it has failed to consider how to position the defense industry and manufacturing base in the context of economic security.

Technologies possessed by the defense industry are military resources but if they are not further developed, security risks could emerge. Japan must not become dependent on foreign countries for all its equipment.

Japan risks ending up with the technological equivalent of bamboo spears if it relies solely on domestic products,

some of which lag behind those of other countries.

We should consider improving nation’s defense capabilities by determining what can be made domestic while actively engaging in joint protection and joint development with other countries.

Having technology that other countries lack would be an ace in the hole for Japan. Other countries would have no choice but to depend on us, enabling Japan to gain control of supply chains.

It will be important, in terms of national security, to know where sensitive technologies are located in Japan and utilize export controls and foreign investment restrictions to prevent them from leaking out of the country.

There is a possibility that artificial intelligence, drones and unmanned submarines, among other innovations, drastically change warfare, making essential for Japan to make progress in the development of such technologies.

The National Security Strategy must become a more comprehensive strategy that includes efforts to bolster economic security.

The interview was conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun Staff Writer Hirotaka Kuriya

“Possess Counter-Strike Capabilities”

安保戦略改定 ——焦点を聞く——

国家安全保障戦略の改定に向け2021年秋に独自の提言を発表した。元防衛次官や陸海空の元自衛隊幹部が集まり議論を重ねた。①「安全保障」概念の拡大②米中間の戦略的競争の激化③先端技術④気候変動——の4本柱とした。

まず経済安保の位置づけだ。経済安保は現行の戦略に文言がなく概念が曖昧となっている。新技術だけに重点を置くと、かえって何を守るべきか焦点がぼけてしまう。防衛力を支える重要な要素である防衛産業も経済安保に含めるべきだ。

米中対立のはざままで日本独自の防衛力を高める政策が欠かせない。いわゆる敵基地攻撃能力については「反撃能力」という表現を提案する。敵基地攻撃と言ってしまうと、文字通りに相手の基地をたたきイメージが強くなりすぎる。

軍事の合理性を考えれば日本が反撃能力を持つのは当然だ。とはいえ国民の誤解をまねけば冷静な議論を阻みかねない。

反撃能力とは相手の基地に限らず、指揮・統制施設や通信施設などへの攻撃も含む。必ずしも相手国に人的被害をも

元統合幕僚長 折木 良一氏

「敵基地」より「反撃能力」を

たらずとは限らない。ミサイルだけでなく日米間の調整を含む総合的な体制が必要だ。抑止力には相手の攻撃を阻む能力で攻撃を断念させる「拒否的抑止」と、相手に耐えがたい打撃を与えると威嚇して攻撃を断念させる「懲罰的抑止」がある。日本は専守防衛の原則を順守し、脅威が及ぶ場合の対応を重視してきた。安保環境を踏まえればあるべき国家防衛の姿を明確にして、専守防衛の理念を議論して見直す時期だ。

現行の戦略は中国との「戦略的互惠関係」を指すと明記している。たしかに互いの信頼関係が基本なのは当然だ。一方で中国は昨年、沖縄県の尖閣諸島周辺への侵入を繰り返した。これらの現実を日本が厳しく認識しなければいけない。

中国より米国との関係に軸足を置かねばならない。政治的に編み出した中国との「戦略的互惠関係」という造語を次の戦略でも踏襲しつつけるか議論すべきだ。

台湾は日米などと自由や民主主義といった価値観を共有し、周辺には重要な海上交通路（シーレーン）がある。ひとたび台湾有事がおきれば日本固有に直結する。新たな戦略では台湾にも触れざるを得ない。

（聞き手は溝呂木拓也）



Basic Principles of the Study Group

The NSS should be the supreme strategy for a nation that defines how to secure its existence (survival and prosperity). Japan needs to keenly grasp the trend of changes in the global security environment, make decisions promptly, and solidify security by bringing together national powers.

From this perspective, the Group provides the policy recommendations, “*What is required of the new National Security Strategy: To confront the Turbulent Era,*” based on the following three basic principles.

- 1 Developing discussions “**Without Taboos**”
- 2 Recommending with a focus on “**Improving Effectiveness**”
- 3 Aiming for “**Realistic**” Recommendations

Contents

- What is the 2013 NSS?
- Changes in Strategic Environment since 2013
- What is Missing in the 2013 NSS?
- Policy Recommendations

What is the 2013 NSS?

- Is the First Ever NSS for Japan in post WWII Era
- Defines Japan's National Interests
- Mainly Focuses on Defense and Diplomacy
 - + Space, Cyber, Energy, ODA & Maritime
- Guides the policy over the next Decade

Contents

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Changes in Strategic Environment since 2013

- **Expanding** the Scope of National Security and **Blurring** the boundaries between military and non-military, as well as peace and war
- Intensifying **Great Power Competitions**
- **Emerging Technologies** such as AI, 5G, Quantum Computing, Bio Tech, Semiconductors would become Game Changers
- Considerations to **Climate Change**

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What are Missing in the 2013 NSS?

- **Economic Security, Technology Strategy, etc.**

- **Strategic Stance toward PRC**

“become an issue of concern to the int’l community including Japan. GoJ needs to pay careful attention to the situation” (2013NSS)

- **Review of the Basic Defense Policies:**

Counter-Strike Capabilities, Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy, Defense Budget, etc.

- **Considerations to Climate Change**

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- What is the 2013 NSS?
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Policy Recommendations 1/3

- 1 Position the NSS as the highest strategy of Japan
- 2 Review the existing defense policy such as:
 - Examine Exclusively Defense-oriented Policy
 - Possess Counter-Strike Capabilities
 - Increase Defense Budget to 2% of GDP
- 3 Energize the Whole-of-Government Approach
 - Strengthen the Cabinet Office
 - Establish the JSDF's Permanent Joint HQs

Policy Recommendations 2/3

4 Strengthen the Japan-US Alliance

Assume proactive roles in the Alliance

Establish Multi-layered Alliance Structure

Expand the scope of Cooperation areas

5 Realign the relationship with major players

Define China as ‘Potential Threat’

Strengthen the relationship with like-minded countries

6 Make Strategic Approach to New Domains

7 Secure the Maritime Security

Policy Recommendations 3/3

8 Strengthen Intelligence

9 **Develop Economic Security and Strengthen Defense Industries**

Ensure Strategic Autonomy and Strategic Essentiality

Strengthen the Defense Industries

10 Respond proactively to Climate Change

11 Review the NSS structure

Reframe the Strategy Structure;

Based upon the New NSS,

Develop NDS by MoD, instead of NDPG

Develop NMS by Joint Staff